Copyright © 2012 SEQUI, Inc. All Rights reserved. | Privacy Policy
Front door attacks, through the Internet, have been widely publicized. Yet attacks on the (non-routable) back door are far easier to execute than most realize. Tools used for this type of attack are not only available, many are identical to the tools that would be used in the front door attack.
Serial SCADA systems are isolated, out in the open, and unprotected, making them prone to vulnerabilities that can be exploited easily by a “back door” attack. With no security, the system is unable to distinguish between a real and spoofed control signal, allowing the attacker to seize control.
The devices, protocols, and communication media in use by serial SCADA systems do not adequately prevent attacks against remote assets. Common misconceptions are (1) isolation makes these systems secure and unlikely to be compromised and (2) attacks on these systems are made difficult because attackers lack specialized knowledge. In reality, physical isolation does not ensure network security and attackers need only understand a small segment of the system to cause disruption. And the risk is significant, in the legacy environment where there are anywhere from hundreds to tens of thousands of datapoints, a structured attack along multiple points can cause widespread infrastructure disruption.
Vulnerabilities that must be guarded against exploitation:
Protocols (serial DNP3 or Modbus)
Communication media (dial-up, radio, leased)
Vulnerability analysis teams have repeatedly demonstrated exploitable vulnerabilities in SCADA systems. Many of these vulnerabilities now form a part of public domain knowledge.
Critical infrastructures are reliant on control systems for continuous operation. The impact of an attack on these systems for power plants, water treatment facilities, chemical factories, and other vital infrastructure could be devastating, causing financial loss, reputation loss, equipment and environmental damage, and even loss of human lives.
The second step is to install remote EncryptorPaks and activate encryption links while remainder links operate in the clear.
Wired Solution ▲Top
EncryptorPak L secures Ethernet-to-serial and serial-to-serial communications between RTU and Master (serial or Ethernet interface) in point-to-point or multi-drop configurations.
MORE ►
Wireless Solution ▲Top
EncryptorPak Z secures “over-the -air” communications between RTU (serial) and Master (serial or Ethernet interface).
The third step is to operate encryption on all links. As many as 65,535 secure tunnels simultaneously.
Each tunnel has its own Encryption Key and Authentication Key.
Oil Refining
Petro-Chemical
Electric Power Substations
Water & Water Treatment
Chemical Processing
Manufacturing
Key Industries
Presented at the Industrial Control Systems Joint Working Group (ICSJWG) Fall 2011:
IEEE 1711-2010 Security for
Legacy SCADA Protocols
Download PDF
The “retrofit” is actually a proactive and preventative approach to improving the security posture of the legacy network. It is the alternative to tearing down the existing network and replacing it with a new one. The EncryptorPak family conforms to the IEEE 1711-2010, the new SCADA-specific standard. It delivers the strongest security for serial links and addresses all legacy retrofit issues (see below).
The EncryptorPak L adds security to legacy equipment (breakers/relays, meters, IEDs...) and extends the ESP boundary (NERC CIP).
Security for Serial DNP3 or Modbus ▲Top
The EncryptorPak Series is an easy-to-use and cost-effective solution for protecting last mile assets in the industrial control network, such as serial RTUs, PLCs and other field equipment, which are vulnerable to infiltration and sabotage.
The first step of the migration is to install the EncryptorPak at the Control Center and have it pass-through all messages in the clear.
With the EncryptorPak, legacy serial links can be easily retrofitted with security - without disruption or change to the existing equipment. Moreover, migration can be phased-in by securing one link at a time as shown in the steps below.
|
Top Questions |
What Customers Want |
|
How do we plan for migration?
|
Easy migration…
|
|
Do we make changes to our ICS software or equipment? |
Easy installation…
|
|
Do we make changes to our operational control? |
Hassle-free operation…
|
|
Will it impact performance?
|
No impact…
|
|
Will it impact our existing configuration? |
Flexibility…
- Modbus RTU/ASCII - DNP3 - Async 300 to 115200 bps - Point-to-point and multi-drop - Radio, dial-up, leased lines |